Wundt and the History of Psychology

The present newsletter celebrates the 150th anniversary of the publication of the work “Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie” [Principles of Physiological Psychology] published in 1873 by Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920). On the recommendation of our president-elect Dr. Hugo Klappenbach, we would also like to highlight - as a counterbalance - the 160th anniversary of the Vorlesungen and the 140th anniversary of the last volume of Die Logik. This is in order to discuss the version that psychology began with the introduction of the experimental method.

In different works it has been said that the original plans of the first psychology laboratory, built in Germany, were used as a model for the construction of other laboratories in different parts of the world. This historiographical tradition points out that the emergence of psychology (in different territories of the world) has its starting point with the installation of psychology laboratories (Klappenbach, 2006).

Laboratories that made it possible for psychology to constitute itself as a "respectable" scientific field (Boring, 1950, quoted by Klappenbach, 2006, p. 58) given that these spaces were arranged with the necessary devices to experimentally investigate the “immediate experiences of consciousness, including sensations, feelings, volitions and ideas” (britannica.com). This tradition, 150 years later, remains in force in some areas of psychology that are rooted (it is their experimental habitus, in the way of understanding Bourdieu’s concept but as a practice circumscribed to the laboratory space) in the use of mechanisms for measuring brain activity.

Two fundamental issues should be highlighted with this Newsletter. The first is that Wundt “never claimed the constitution of an independent discipline but, on the contrary, envisioned psychology in close relation to philosophy” (Ash, 1980; Brock, 1993; Danziger, 1979, 1980, cited by Klappenbach, 2006, p. 58). The second is that “Psychology emerged in a variety of ways in different cultural settings shaping different disciplinary matrices or different programmes of Psychology” (Canguilhem, 1958; Gondra, 1997; Klappenbach, 1994; Leahey, 1987, cited by Klappenbach, 2006, p. 58).

In this sense, and in order to invite the reader to read this interesting Newsletter, we would like to leave you with the question posed by our authors Natalie Rodax and Gerhard Benetka: Why leave philosophy out of the field of psychology? That is the purpose of this Newsletter: to point out that Wundt’s most decisive legacy for psychology was not the blueprints of his laboratory but the imperative need to enrich the psychologist’s thinking with the soul of philosophical research.

Reference


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**Dear colleague,**

It is a pleasure to send you this issue of the Division 18 Newsletter (History of Applied Psychology) which is dedicated to the contribution of Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920) in psychology. Besides, we also commemorate the 150th anniversary of the publication of his book “the Principles of Physiological Psychology (rundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie)” in 1874, which has had a significant impact on the development of psychology.

Wundt is physiologist, philosopher and psychologist who is widely regarded as the founder of experimental psychology and the father of modern psychology. He established the first psychology laboratory in Leipzig in 1879, where he conducted research on sensation, perception, attention, reaction time, feeling, emotion, association, and will. His laboratory became a model for other psychological institutions around the world.

His writings shaped the course of psychological thought and research for decades. Wundt's influence on psychology was immense and lasting since he was also a prolific and influential philosopher who contributed to the fields of logic, epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, and aesthetics. He trained many students who became prominent psychologists, such as Edward Titchener, James McKeen Cattell, Hugo Münsterberg, G. Stanley Hall, Charles Spearman, Oswald Külpe, Emil Kraepelin, and William James.

Wundt's experimental psychology was based on two assumptions: (1) that mental processes can be decomposed into simple elements or components; and (2) that these elements can be combined or synthesized into complex mental states or processes. He called his approach structuralism, because he aimed to discover the structure of the mind by identifying its basic elements and their laws of combination.

Wundt distinguished between immediate experience, which is the direct and uninterpreted sensation of stimuli, and mediate experience, which is the result of applying concepts and categories to sensations. Furthermore, Wundt's experimental psychology focused on what he called individual psychology, which is the study of normal mental processes in adults. However, he also recognized the importance of studying other aspects of human mind and behaviour, such as development, abnormality, sociality, and culture.

Wundt called this branch of psychology collective psychology or cultural psychology (Völkerpsychologie), which he considered a complement to individual psychology. He devoted ten volumes to this topic, in which he analysed the origins and development of language, myth, religion, art, law, morality, and customs. He also wrote extensively on topics such as linguistics, logic, ethics, religion, and cultural psychology. However, he also faced criticism and rejection from some of his contemporaries and successors who challenged his assumptions, methods, and conclusions. His structuralism was opposed by functionalism, behaviourism, gestalt psychology and psychoanalytic, which offered alternative perspectives on the nature and function of consciousness. His introspection was questioned for its validity, reliability, and objectivity.

In conclusion, Wundt's legacy for psychology is relevant. He established psychology as an independent and rigorous science that uses empirical methods to study mental phenomena. He also provided a comprehensive and systematic framework for understanding human mind and behaviour in its individual and collective aspects.
This Newsletter presents some relevant contributions related to the work of Wundt in psychology. Professor Helio Carpintero examines the richness of the thought of Wundt which appear in some of the first historical constructions about the emergence of scientific psychology. Professor Natalie Rodax and Professor Gerhard Benetka have made an interesting contribution analysing the Wundt's view of the relationship between philosophy and psychology. Professor Hugo Klappenbach analyses Some mythical issues surrounding Wundt's status as the father of experimental psychology.

We profit this opportunity to invite all of you to look for and then send us information and news related to those historical sites at which psychology was created thanks to the efforts of our masters and giants. You might also suggest new topics for the coming issues. Our newsletter tries to be our common work, and an important piece for our common memory.

Very cordially,

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Wundt's psychology in the histories of psychology

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The figure of Wilhelm Wundt appears linked, in multiple historical accounts, to the initial moment of the emergence of scientific psychology. As this science has grown, changes have been taking place in its theoretical body, while the field of its practical applications has expanded. However, the version that refers its origin to the Wundtian decision to bring the study of mental processes to the new framework of the physiologically oriented laboratory has been maintained. Thus, the previous “armchair” psychology, of pure introspective analysis, which had been exploring conscious experience, far from the usual parameters in exploring the processes of nature, was abandoned.

However, this very general and dominant vision in histories and manuals today is quite far from what can be found in the first historical pictures of our science, those appearing in the first known studies, closer in time to that starting moment. We would like here to examine some of the first interpretations about the great Leipzig savant, which appear in some of the first historical constructions about the emergence of scientific psychology. We will consider some of the versions that can be found about Wundt in studies of authors rather close in time to that figure, that appears interpreted according to the cultural traditions they represent.

We have selected, here, the interpretations that can be found in the works of Théodule Ribot (1879), Désiré Mercier (1897), Guido Villa (1899), Otto Klemm (1919), Juan Vicente Viqueira (1930) and Edwin G. Boring (1929), very notable representatives of the intellectual traditions of their respective countries. We will try to discover those possible coincidences and divergences, which could have modulated the development of international psychology over time.

THÉODULE RIBOT

Théodule Ribot (1839-1916), highly influential French psychologist and philosopher, who in 1888 was appointed Professor of Experimental Psychology at the College de France, and whose work on clinical psychology was widely known and studied. Widely trained in philosophy, he knew how to incorporate the evolutionary views to the problems of psychology.

His historical vision of the new science led him to differentiate between ancient psychology, dedicated to the study of the soul, a topic that didn’t interest him at all, and the new experimental science, oriented towards the analysis of psychic phenomena.
Far from metaphysical reflection, he treated with the phenomena of consciousness as processes linked to nervous processes. In his view, this new science was formed by two different traditions, which he studied successively: an English, associationist one, to which he dedicated a book in 1870, and a German, experimentalist one, which he analyzed in a second book that appeared in 1879. In the pages of the latter, naturally, he deals with the figure of Wundt.

How did he see him? He placed the German researcher within a broader framework, that one of physiological psychology, and considered him as the "main representative, at present, of experimental psychology in Germany"; in his view, Wundt "is the only one who has embraced it to its full extent" (Ribot, s.a., 273). He sees this figure within a tradition in which the names of Fechner and Helmholtz precede him, but only the Leipzig professor cultivates the global field of that science. His method consists of "relying on the data of physiology" (Id., 274) to study sensations, the basis of mental life. For Wundt, all phenomena, says Ribot, "reduce... to only one: sensation" (Id., 294); and the changes in the subject that the sensations and perceptions produce, are precisely the feeling, which moves between pleasure and pain (Id., 324). Feelings are diversified by those objective relations appearing in them, and they open the large field of will actions, ethnic relations and diverse social organizations (Id., 336).

Ribot ends by admitting that "Wundt's fundamental thesis... is the identity of mechanism and logic - of the physical and the psychic - of the unconscious and the conscious" (Id., 356). And he adds: the physical fact is reduced to movement, and the psychic one, to reasoning, but both are "identical at the bottom"; the only difference between the two is "their point of view" (Id., 358). Facing the traditional substantialist dualism, Ribot agrees with the Wundtian thesis of a processual monism, resulting from the unity of all that is real. After all, his positivist vision allowed him to easily assume the metaphysical monism present in Wundt's work.

DÉSIRÉ MERCIER

We also find in Belgium an important echo of Wundt's work. It is offered, for now, by a notable historical work on psychology published by Cardinal Désiré Mercier (1851-1926), one of the most notable personalities of neo-Thomist thought, and a very prominent figure in the academic movement represented by the Catholic University of Louvain, of which he himself was rector.

He was a cardinal of the Catholic Church, he also founded a Higher Institute of Philosophy at the aforementioned University, and he largely contributed to the efforts made within Catholic thought to integrate into its scientific and intellectual groups the secular thought of that time.

The image of Wundt that offers Mercier in his work (Mercier, 1897) is interesting, because, while recognizing the value of the scientific thought of the former one, he focuses his analysis on the philosophical aspects appearing in the Wundtian psychological writings.

When studying contemporary psychology, Mercier intends above all to "summarize the philosophical thought of our contemporaries" (Mercier, 1897, ix), choosing as the most outstanding representatives of that thought the works of Herbert Spencer, Alfred Fouillée, and Wilhelm Wundt - an Englishman, a Frenchman and a German, respectively (ibid.). He considers those three names as the 'first figures' of their intellectual field.

For Mercier, Wundt is both a scientist and a philosopher, who is in search of a thought that would solve the fundamental problems of psychology without falling into materialistic mechanism (Id., 105).
With that purpose, Mercier examines the idea that this new discipline is "the rigorously immediate science of the concrete data of consciousness" (Id., 174). Its own object of study is precisely those chained 'acts' through which consciousness takes place. In experience, we are not given 'objects', says Mercier, but rather 'facts'. According to such a dynamic condition, its interpretative model must be a 'voluntarism', from which one would come to understand the self ('le moi') as a 'want', and the soul as an 'activity', an idea more appropriate than the one of a 'soul-substance' (Id., 202).

From the neo-Thomist position of the historian, he will understand the dynamism of the real as a monistic one (Id., 429), but at the same time he sees in it a radical rejection of materialism. In his opinion, Wundt would have maintained a metaphysical agnosticism, acceptable at least in a provisional way. These brief notes are enough to highlight the philosophical perspective that Mercier has prioritized in the work of the great German researcher, and that undoubtedly constitutes an important facet of his thought.

GUIDO VILLA

In the world of the early Italian psychology, Wundt had an admirer and disciple, Federico Kiesow, (1858-1940), a professor in Turin, who would organize an experimental psychology laboratory focused on the study of sensations, and whose position has been considered by some as an "uncompromising Wundtian experimentalism" (Marhaba, 1992, 33). But other currents were to emerge, with a different orientation. The philosopher Guido Villa (1867-1949), a professor at a high school in Rome, and later at the University, is the author of a considerable historical work: La psicologia contemporanea. Published in 1899, a book in which he maintains a position favorable to a philosophical psychology.

The work has been considered as "explicitly spiritualist and ultravoluntaristic" (Marhaba, 1992, 149), very critical regarding the experimentalist orientation. In any case, he believes that the Wundtian book on Physiological Psychology is "the most perfect work on the subject" (Villa, 1902, 68).

He also mentions the creation of the Leipzig laboratory, "the first laboratory of physiological psychology" (Id., 68). He also mentioned some other Wundtian ideas, as his opposition between the idea of psychology as a science of "direct experience", while the natural sciences would be a knowledge of "indirect experience"; or his definition of physiological psychology as a "simple application of physiological methods" to psychology (Id. 71). In order to analyze more complex social and historical phenomena, Wundt wrote his ten volumes of Cultural psychology (Völkerpsychologie); finally, he also mentions the dynamics that leads from the psychic elements – sensation and feeling – to the most complex conscious mental compounds (Id., 72). Villa also remarked the Wundtian basic position of a psychophysical parallelism, at the same time far from spiritualism and materialism (Id., 205), and promoting, instead of substantialism, "the so-called actuality of psychic facts" (Id., 497).

In a critical summary at the end of his work, Villa considers that "the most original psychologists of the 19th century" have been Bain and Fechner, along with Spencer and Wundt (Id., 584 n1). He also judged that the work on "Lectures about Human and Animal Psychology", edited in 1863, offers a study of "the whole psychological matter with a generally empirical method", but, in his view, Wundt had definitely maintained that next to "the reality of matter we also had to recognize the reality of the 'spirit', whose importance will grow in accordance with the progressive development of civilization" (Id., 589). The subsequent appearance of the important philosopher Benedetto Croce (1866-1952), defender of an idealism that would organize history, would prolong this position of remoteness from experimental psychology, something that Agostino Gemelli,OFM, (1878-1959) would somehow help to overcome a few years later.

OTTO KLEMM

In Germany, we find an early history of psychology published by Otto Klemm (1884-1939), who became professor of applied psychology at the University of Leipzig, the same one where Wundt did all his mature work. It is therefore not surprising that in the prologue of his book he says: "this work bears the stamp of W. Wundt, whose own ideas, in a unique consortium with the historical tradition, seem to have come to indicate a particular route to Psychology" (Klemm, 1919, 2). Although this history is oriented towards the presentation of the different intervening factors in psychic life, and does not offer individualized expositions of successive researchers, he did not fail to note that in the face of a 'pure psychology', which we might clearly assume to be introspective, in the new science what has been developed is the "natural-historical science" (Ibid.), of which Wundt represents one of its leading figures.

From the affirmation of a complete "actualism" it moves away from a 'concept of soul substance' (Id., 30), to focus on its own objective, which is the study of "immediate experience" (Id., 160). This has sensations and feelings as the basic elements from which the complex structure of experience will be built, through a dynamism that will be conceived from the voluntarist model. For Klemm, Wundtian
psychology undoubtedly represents a fruitful direction, which is inserted without difficulty in a broader movement, in which processes, and not substances, occupy the basic place of the system. His book has focused on the study of the evolution of fundamental psychological concepts, (Id., 7), and the globality of that evolution has clearly incorporated the uniqueness of Wundt's work.

One of the most interesting contributions to the knowledge of this German psychologist is, in our opinion, that made by the Spanish author Juan Vicente Viqueira (1886-1924), a philosophy professor closely linked to a Europeanist group, the “Free Institution of Education”, which aspired to achieve the social renewal of the country through a deep educational action. Viqueira furthered his studies in Germany, especially with G.E. Müller, in Göttingen and, although he died very early, nevertheless left an important posthumous work on Contempory Psychology (1930). In it he studies in great detail the figure and work of Wundt. His presentation of the German psychologist is very complete; it is perhaps the most comprehensive of all those included here. It brings together in one chapter his basic ideas on psychology as a natural science, and in another his studies on the psychology of peoples. He thinks that this new science has been made possible by the convergence of philosophy, physics, and physiology, and that these elements have been "united by Wundt, for the first time" (Idem, 9); in other words, "the full systematics of psychological science has been elaborated by Wundt for the first time, and that the methods of Psychology have been presented by him, also for the first time, in their entirety and reciprocal relationship" (Viqueira, 1930, 9).

Before Wundt, he claims, psychology was no more than "a chapter of philosophy" (ibid.); now it is a new field endowed with its own personality. This is a field where, together with empirical studies, an essential problem continues to subsist, a "psychological metaphysics" or "science of the soul", which not only questions the occurrence of certain phenomena, but also their intimate nature. On the other hand, in front of those who have spoken of the "crisis" of psychology, Viqueira maintains that precisely the practical applications, when they are effective, are the best proof of the existence of a science that provides them with a solid foundation - and this is the case of psychology (Id. 11). What is given to man's knowledge constitutes the totality of experience; how that experience occurs in each individual, how each individual lives his experience with total immediacy, these are problems that Wundt has assigned to psychology. On the other hand, the study of the experience without its subject, as a mere field of interactions between its diverse contents, is precisely the sciences’ object.

Viqueira recalls the key moment of the founding of the Leipzig laboratory, the scope of its physiological psychology manual, and the rich and complex vision that his cultural psychology (Völkerpsychologie) offers about man. In short, in Viqueira's book on contemporary psychology, a third of it is directly referred to the figure of Wundt. For the rest of the work, it includes also a chapter on introspective psychology (Brentano, Dilthey and others), another on objectivist psychology (Watson, Driesch, Freud), and two chapters dedicated one to William James and another to Henri Bergson. This is, as it can be seen, a personal and original work, which synthetically reflects the complex plot of modern psychology until the time when its author systematized it.

EDWIN G. BORING

Finally, let us see the Wundt’s image outlined by Edwin G. Boring (1886-1968) in his classic work, A history of experimental psychology (1929). Disciple of E.B. Titchener, and a professor at Harvard University for most of his life (1922-1960), a convinced supporter of experimental psychology, sought in this book to present the development of that science as a theoretical and rigorous knowledge, at a time when in the United States the applied aspects of that science multiplied, largely because of the great utility it had shown in solving social problems during World War I. In his exposition of Wundt, he attended almost exclusively to his psychophysiological research work. He also sought to underline those roots that linked American psychology to the experimentalist world carried on in the Leipzig laboratory (Tortosa et al., 1992).

In so doing, he linked US psychology to the origins of the new scientific field, seeking in a certain way its full legitimacy. Thus, referring to Wundt, he said: “he is the first man who without reservation is properly called a psychologist” (Id., 310).

In this work there is considerable interest in presenting in detail the life of Wundt and his great personality. Attention is paid here to the peculiar relationships that the great man had with his family in his childhood, his changes in school and university, the great influence that the vicar F. Müller, his main educator, exerted on him, and his initial vocation as a physiologist that would in the end turned to psychology. “Wundt held a chair of philosophy, as the German psychologists still do, and wrote voluminously on philosophy; but in his own eyes of him as in the eyes of the world he was, first and foremost, a psychologist. When we call him the 'founder' of experimental psychology, we mean both that he promoted the idea of psychology as an independent science and that he is the senior among 'psychologists' " (Id., 310). Boring also accepts that
the creation of the Leipzig laboratory, although there had been some occasional precedents, was the first formal instance of the establishment of a 'Psychologisches Institut', with an "independently administrative existence" (Id., 318). In his presentation, we find an interesting conceptual theoretical systematization. Emphasis is placed on the idea of the 'immediate experience' as the proper object of this new science (Id., 327). Its basic elements, sensations and feelings, operating in mental processes, would be the materials that would create more complex phenomena through a 'psychic causality', which was determining the interdependence of all the data of experience, and the higher process of apperception. This chapter ends by synthesizing a series of data summarizing the main contributions of the Leipzig laboratory to the history of psychology.

It is interesting to note that the experimentalist perspective adopted here by the author in his presentation led him to consider only the strict field of experimental psychology, leaving out of his story everything related to social and cultural psychology.

Boring was mainly interested, as it has already been said, in linking the American psychology of his time with these Wundtian roots. Undoubtedly, he was seeking a glorious ancestor for it, and he did not fail to notice that America had followed this model and his teachings. And, as a proof for such thesis, Boring reviewed and quoted a long list of names of first-rate authors who had been American disciples of the master, from G. Stanley Hall and J. McKeen Cattell onwards.

Boring, who limited himself to presenting basic ideas of the teacher's experimental psychology, was moreover the author who did more to show the social impact that the Leipzig laboratory had on the world of new psychology, and the great imprint that Wundt finished leaving in the history of psychology.

**FINAL CONSIDERATIONS**

We find ourselves before a plurality of images referred to the same reality. The different angles adopted by these scholars to contemplate the Wundtian work show the richness of the thought of the great German researcher and thinker. However, each one has tended to accentuate that dimension they had found more interesting to consider.

In some cases, such interest had been linked to the philosophical problems related to the psyche. There is no doubt, on this point, that Cardinal Mercier has mainly attended to the conception relative to the nature of the psychic, and of conscious experience, and from his neo-Thomist position he has underlined the distance of Wundtian thought with respect to a reductionist materialism, leaving open a path for his own basically hylomorphic substantialist conception, typical of Aristotelianism and Thomism, with which this author felt himself identified. Less intensely, but also interested in the actualist and non-substantialist aspect of the psyche, we could place Professor Guido Villa, also undoubtedly moved by philosophical training and interests.

Other authors have paid special attention to the relevance that Wundt granted to the experimental method, and to the decisive turn he impressed to psychology in the direction of natural science. Ribot, undoubtedly moved by a positivist inspiration, was strongly opposed to introspective attitudes that had been largely influential in the past in France, and that other authors such as H. Taine had already energetically combated. He then tended to emphasize the psychophysiological aspects, and the unitary condition of psychic phenomena.

The image that we find in Viqueira's text seems to be, of all those examined here, the one that offers a more complete, and perhaps a more historical vision of the German researcher. In his pages there is a careful presentation of the different psychic processes, both experimental and psycho-physiological orientation, as well as the social and cultural psychology (Völkerpsychologie). These two dimensions of psychology received equal attention, although they had had very different impact in subsequent research. Viqueira's view is, in our opinion, the most complete and informative synthesis of the topic.

And finally, the image of Wundt that E.G. Boring offered in his book, as we have already said, was totally adequate to place that 'great man' at the true original point of the broad movement of US scientific psychology, making of him a true 'founder' of that current and giving to it a great antiquity and nobility '. From such an important ancestor, several lines of research had emerged, and a long list of names of Wundt's US disciples (the aforementioned G. Stanley Hall, J. McKe. Cattell, E. B).
As it can be seen from these stories, the interpretation and exegesis made in them of a central figure such as Wilhelm Wundt in psychology were, in our opinion, oriented by some defined purposes, which in some cases were related to certain conceptual interpretations, and in others represented the desire to create a certain legitimacy of an intellectual lineage, through its connection to those roots and traditions that were admired and respected in the world of psychology. The figure of Wilhelm Wundt seems to have had a representative and identity value that, without creating any sort of paradigm, guided and inspired multiple lines of descent, and has provided with a certain unity to all those who cultivate psychology and recognize themselves as debtors of his work.

On such a ground, I wanted here to remember her name and her work as relevant when we are almost a century away from her investigations in the field of developmental psychology.

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Get philosophy out of psychology!
– Existence, no longer a struggle in psychology?

110 years ago, Wilhelm M. Wundt published the second edition of a text he entitled Die Psychologie im Kampf ums Dasein Psychology’s (Wundt, 1913) or translated: Psychology’s Struggle for Existence (Wundt, 2013, English translation by James T. Lamiell, 2012). In this comparably short – it only counts 38 pages! – but well-thought-out analysis of the state of psychology in the canon of disciplines at the time, Wundt departed from the fact that both philosophy and psychology of the German-speaking world fought for their freedom from one another. Wundt called a mutual urge for “divorcing” psychology from its “mother discipline” (Mutterwissenschaft, Wundt, 1913, p. 1).

Ultimately, the background to this urge for divorce is a problem of philosophy: Why should there still be chairs of philosophy? In the light of the methodical re-orientation of the universities at the time (orientation towards the use of empirical methods), philosophy is coming under pressure. Accordingly, psychology is a sort of ‘rescue operation’ for philosophy: If empirical research is carried out in the field of philosophy, it is justified that there are philosophy chairs. Philosophers, however, resist this since empirical research in philosophy, primarily executed through the use of experiments, is logically demanding: Conducting an experiment presupposes the validity of logical laws; logical validity itself therefore cannot be proven by experiments.

In logic, philosophy finds a genuinely exclusive field of knowledge. Philosophy thus aims at distinguishing itself from psychology and introduces the concept of psychologism for this purpose: A concept that ultimately refuses to reduce philosophical questions to experimental-psychological investigations.

Paradoxically and in the long run, the actual empirical ‘rescue operation’ for philosophy – integrating psychology – does not lead to strengthening philosophy’s position in the canon of the disciplines, but the conceptual demarcation from it.

That the demarcation was already in full swing is shown, among other things, by the actual filling of chairs at the time: Since 1879, more and more laboratories and with it institutes of experimental psychology have been founded in the German-speaking area. Besides Wundt’s laboratory in Leipzig, Hermann Ebbinghaus founded one in Berlin in 1886, Georg Elias Müller one in Göttingen in 1887, Carl Stumpf one in Munich in 1889, and so on (Benetka, 2021, see Ash, 1995).

This quickly brings the total to 17 such laboratories and institutes in German-speaking countries between 1879 and 1912, i.e. at the time when wars began in the run-up to the First World War. This was also related to the fact that experimental psychologists took up professorships in philosophy.
Between 1892 and 1914 in Germany, there was an increase in the number of professorships in philosophy but more importantly, during the same time frame, the number of experimental psychologists occupying such positions increased more than threefold (Ash, 1985, p. 53, as cited in Benetka, 2021).

In Marburg specifically (Marburger Lehrstuhlstreit, for instance addressed in Benetka, 2021), this culminated in the following situation: Until 1912, two New Kantians, Herman Cohen and Paul Natorp, taught philosophy there. When a chair became vacant and had to be filled, the two suggested Ernst Cassirer. In fact, however, Erich Rudolph Jaensch was appointed to the chair, an experimental psychologist whose teacher had previously been Georg Elias Müller, who was considered a leader in the method of experimental psychology.

This caused such indignation among those who advocated a ‘strict’ teaching of philosophy that a Declaration against appointing philosophical chairs with representatives of experimental psychology (Erklärung gegen die Besetzung von philosophischen Lehrstühlen mit Vertretern der experimentellen Psychologie) was put forward in 1913 (see Ash, 1985). We do not go into detail as to how this was referred to by contemporaries at that time (see Benetka, 2021 for more detail), what is rather important for us is the fact that the separation of psychology from philosophy hinged on the method, namely experimental methodology.

Indeed, what Wundt also emphasises in his analysis of the situation is that it was a matter of psychology reserving for itself the means of exact methods, particularly the experiment, that led to two motives in the urge for separation: While philosophy aims at protecting itself from the “intruders” (Wundt, 2013 [1913], p. 197) and does not want to see their strict teachings simplified by experimental-methodological ‘technique’, psychology sees its subject of experimental psychology as being called to independence: “psychologists emphasize also the growing significance of their discipline for practical work in other related disciplines, making it necessary for lectures and instructional courses offered by psychologists to be extended far beyond the borders that have been recognized heretofore” (Wundt, 2013 [1913], p. 198).

According to Wundt’s argument, the real problem that stems from this dispute is that the method of experimentation distinguishes the disciplines and that something fatal goes hand in hand with this: if psychology frees itself from philosophy, it also frees itself from the possibility of founding its objects logically:

In psychology divorced from philosophy, philosophical considerations will be latent, and so it is possible that psychologists who will have abandoned philosophy, and whose education in philosophy is therefore deficient, will be projecting those considerations only through an immature metaphysical perspective (Wundt, 2013 [1913], p. 206).

Even if the separation of philosophy and psychology was predicated upon the method of experimental psychology, it is important to understand that Wundt criticised that experimental psychology could not be equated with psychology as a whole:

Instead, that single word signifies to them the entirety of their subject matter. They call themselves experimental psychologists, and in turn regard themselves either as free to ignore those areas of psychology that do not make use of experimental methods, or, what is worse, treat those areas of research experimentally. (Wundt, 2013 [1913], p. 208).

According to Wundt, the experiment was only applicable to a comparatively small area of psychology – to simple mental functions. And should these areas – the experiments on memory, the experiments on reaction time, the experiments on thinking – simply exist loosely side by side and not be built on a solid logic of an overall psychology, psychologists would actually become “mere craftsmen, and, at that, not of the most useful sort” (Wundt, 2013 [1913], p. 206).

In order to understand the extent of Wundt’s argument and thus also its relevance for today’s psychology, one must first understand that Wundt did not see experimental psychology - individual psychology – as standing alone as ‘the’ logic that psychology as a whole had to follow. He argued otherwise, namely that psychology was an intermediary (Vermittlerin, Wundt, 2013 [1913], p. 209) between empirical, exact sciences and philosophy and that when it was provided with a pluralism of methods, it could also address the complex mental functions, such as those of thought.

WUNDT'S REASONS FOR POSITIONING PSYCHOLOGY AS 'MEDIATOR' - INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY & CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY (VÖLKERPSYCHOLOGIE)

At this point, then, we need to understand how Wundt’s logic of psychology, has developed over time. Wundt – born 1832 in Neckarau, Germany – studied medicine, and in 1855 completed the state examination. He then – for a short time – worked practically as an assistant doctor in Heidelberg and after this (1956) went to Berlin to work in physiological laboratories. He came back to Heidelberg and habilitated there. In 1858 Wundt got his first job as a research assistant, namely as Hermann von Helmholtz’ assistant in Heidelberg. When he after 1864 withdrew from Helmholtz’ Institute, he
retained his teaching position at the University of Heidelberg, publishing successful textbooks.

After first receiving an extraordinariate in Anthropology and Medical Psychology, he was appointed to the University of Zurich for a chair of Inductive Philosophy in 1875 and then finally to a chair of Philosophy in Leipzig (Benetka, 2002, pp. 64-65). Even though much about this time is known to experimental psychological work, Wundt early on placed a complementary to experimental psychology alongside his complete programme of psychology, namely that of Völkerpsychologie (cultural psychology).

Despite the fact that he published his investigations into the Völkerpsychologie quite late in his life (comprising 10 volumes, published from 1900 to 1920), only Wundt experts know that he began early on to provide psychology with a research programme that could deal precisely not only with the simple mental functions – which was the purpose and concern of experimental Individual Psychology – but also with the higher, more complex mental processes. In his autobiography, Wundt writes:

When, also around 1860, I considered adding a kind of superstructure to experimental psychology, which, in accordance with its original intention and the means at its disposal, had to limit itself to the facts of the individual life of the soul (Seelenleben), a superstructure which, starting from these facts as indispensable foundations, would have to set itself the task of studying the phenomena of human social life, especially in its beginnings, this task soon seemed to me to be the higher and, in truth, the actual final task of psychology. Nevertheless, I had no intention of moving into this field at this stage. Instead, for the time being, I intended to address psychology at most in its usual scope and even in this only in the areas of sensation and sensory perception that are close to the physiologist. (Wundt, 1921, p. 201-202, our translation).

In fact, however, as early as 1863, in his lectures on the Mensch und Thierseele (Human and Animal Soul, see Benetka, 2002, p. 89), we find a division of psychology into individual psychology, i.e. of the sensory impressions given directly to me, a psychology of the animal soul, and a psychology of “universal mental products” (allgemeingültige geistige Erzeugnisse) that arise out of the interaction between human beings (Völkerpsychologie). However, it is no wonder that little is known about the early remarks on Völkerpsychologie – Wundt himself was not proud of these early remarks, so that Benetka uses the term “youth sin” (2002, p. 90).

But what is it ultimately that makes Völkerpsychologie interesting? First, a methodological problem: Wundt argues that in the application of the experiment we must assume that the process under investigation can be repeated indefinitely without any changes. However, in psychology, this assumption can only be reliably upheld for very simple processes that are linked to external stimuli, so that the same process can be reproduced again and again. This is not the case for complex mental processes, such as thinking. Therefore, the experiment is limited to simple mental processes.

Second, individual psychology consistently refrains from an analysis of those phenomena that arise from the mental interaction of a multitude of individuals. For this very reason, however, it requires a supplementary of the mental processes connected with the interaction (Zusammenleben) of human beings. It is this investigation which we assign to Völkerpsychologie as its task (Wundt, 1900, p. 1).

Therefore, one could only understand mental functions properly when one would understand their developmental dynamics, the developmental laws of mental phenomena that are to be understood as supra-individual. The study of individual mental functions (Individual Psychology) would therefore have to be extended and understood against the background of the history, the becoming of universal mental products (allgemeingültige geistige Erzeugnisse). It is important, however, that one does not arrive at this by the method of experimentation. Wundt repeatedly insisted that there were objects “that by their very nature are not amenable to experimentation” (Wundt, 2013 [1913], p. 108). Individual psychology and cultural psychology (Völkerpsychologie) are two faces of psychology and each need distinct methodological programmes – he thus presented a pluralism of methods within one logic of psychology.

In 1880, the first edition of the Logic volumes appeared and from 1908 onwards and was revised multiple times. Finally, the Logic was published in three volumes: Volume one on General Logic and Epistemology, volume two on Logic of the Exact Sciences and volume three on Logic of the Humanities (for details see Rodax et al., 2023). With the third volume, Wundt separated the methodologies of the exact sciences and the humanities, dedicating a full additional volume (volume three) only to the Logic of the Humanities, in which Wundt also discusses the logic of psychology (individual psychology, but also the Völkerpsychologie) and their different methodological underpinnings.

One thing about his methodological analysis of psychology, in particular, seems remarkable to us today: Wundt’s logical and methodological analysis of the two psychologies is already deeply psychological itself. In it, Wundt describes general reasoning strategies of exact logic (volume II, e.g., induction, deduction) in reference
to psychological processes that are needed for this, such as the ability to analyse and synthesise, for which he discusses the systematic processing of their mutual relation in psychological terms. Additionally, in the psychology-specific logic (volume III), he does not only describe experimental method of psychology (individual psychology), he also introduces the approach of interpretation, in which he recognises a central method for cultural psychology (Völkerpsychologie). For this purpose, he discusses on the one hand understanding as central and – well aware of the fact that the thinking of the researcher is also social – therefore introduces, on the other hand, the method of criticism in order to critically question processes of understanding (Rodax et al., 2023). With this differentiation we see that Wundt places psychology on a logic in which it could unfold its full potential precisely when there is a coherent logic that would give ground to a pluralism of methods.

Have ‘we’ successfully gotten psychology out of philosophy?

When reading about Wundt’s fear of the consequences of separating psychology from philosophy in his text on Psychology’s Struggle for Existence today, seems surprisingly contemporary, at least for the state of psychology in the German context: For Wundt it was “inconceivable that they [the more general questions, and hence the ones that for an education in psychology are the most important, are so closely connected with epistemological and metaphysical positions] will at some point disappear from psychology” (Wundt, 2013 [1913], p. 206). However, the focus of experimentation today has indeed – contra Wundt’s logic – expanded. It is now considered the ‘via regia’ for researching complex psychological objects – whose basic methodological questions are no longer debated today, exactly as Wundt feared. This is not to say that the progress of experimental psychology has not in principle led to successes; what a review of Wundt’s ideas enables us to do today is to formulate a critique of something that has become so unquestioningly established as the standard, and that is the extensive quantification of psychological phenomena – not only by but also through experiment.

However, measurement in today’s experimental research is understood differently than Wundt understood measurement. For Wundt, reaction time measurement was about the measurable objectification of a simple mental process, not about the measurement of a complex latent construct, such as intelligence measurements or the score of depressiveness. As Michell (e.g. 1999) impressively argues, what is missing is precisely the philosophical engagement with the question of whether psychological phenomena can follow a quantifying logic of measurement at all. This means – and this is what we would like to conclude – that looking at Wundt’s warning about the loss of a philosophical engagement still reveals something troubling to us today: The logic of research, the engagement with the epistemology and methodology of psychological research is no longer existentially debated. Thus today – with getting psychology out of philosophy – the existence of psychology apart from philosophy is no longer a question, and precisely this seems to open up the very problem field that Wundt had already anticipated over 100 years ago.

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Some mythical issues surrounding Wundt's status as the father of experimental psychology

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The celebration of the 150th anniversary of the Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie, the 160th anniversary of the first edition of the Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Tierseele and the 140th anniversary of the last volume of Die Logik requires consideration of the first major difficulty in dealing with Wundt's work: the extraordinary breadth and complexity of his writings. Wundt's own daughter, Wundt, compiled more than 490 publications totalling nearly 53,000 pages (Wundt, 1927).

Including later translations, David Robinson raised the figure to 540 (Robinson, 2001). Within this enormous amount of works, Wundt scholars tried to focus on the most outstanding works. Saulo Araujo (2016) selected about 90 fundamental works including reprints and translations, while Alan Kim (2022) highlighted about 30. At the same time, what Wundt scholars began to detect from 1980 onwards is that Wundt's work demands a multidisciplinary analysis, since philosophical, epistemological, psychological, anthropological, cultural and physiological considerations are intimately intertwined (Araujo, 2016; Danziger, 1980).

In 1979, on the 100th anniversary of Wundt's founding of the famous Experimental Psychology Laboratory at Leipzig, a series of tributes were paid, and several works were published that, in some way, showed this complexity. At the same time, those works opened up questions about the traditional characterization of Wundt simply as an experimental psychologist as well as other mythical issues (Blumenthal, 1980; Bringmann & Tweney, 1980; Bringmann & Ungerer, 1980; Danziger, 1979a, 1980; Robinson, 1982).

But there is a second difficulty. An important part of this work is only in German, and even with all the progress in the compilation of archival documents, there are still unexploited materials and missing documents and correspondence. In that direction, the famous Wundt collection, which had been bought in Japan, has lost many books, some of which were donated to the Leipzig Institute itself (Takasuna, 2001). On the other hand, part of Wundt's original laboratory was destroyed during the Second World War, resulting in the loss of documents, texts and apparatus (Maximilian Wontorra, 2008, personal communication).

In 1912, in an almost forgotten book, three main sources for the analysis of Wundt's work were pointed out (Passkönig, 1912). From the standpoint of individual psychology, the author emphasized the importance of "Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie" (Wundt, 1874); from the perspective of animal psychology, "Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Tierseele" (Wundt, 1863); and regarding cultural psychology or the psychology of peoples, "Elemente der Völkerpsychologie" (Wundt, 1912).

Wilhelm Wundt himself, in the preface to his "Grundriss der Psychologie" (Wundt, 1896a), also highlighted the significance of the first two works, albeit with slight differences from Passkönig's statements:

The relation in which this book stands to my earlier psychological works will be apparent after what has been said. The "Grundzüge der psychologischen Psychologie" aims to bring the means employed by the natural sciences, especially by physiology, into the service of psychology, and to give a critical presentation of the experimental methods of psychology, which have developed in the last few decades together with their chief results. This special problem rendered necessary a relative subordination of the general psychology points of view. The second, revised edition of the "Vorlesungen über die Menschen- und Tierseele" (the first edition has long been out of date) seeks to give a more popular account of the character and purpose of experimental psychology, and to discuss from the position thus defined...
those psychological questions which are also of more general philosophical importance. While the treatment in the “Grudzüge” is, accordingly, determined, in the main, by the relations of psychology to physiology, and the treatment in the “Vorlesungen” by philosophical interests, this Outlines aims to present psychology in its own proper coherency, and in the systematic order that the nature of the subject-matter seems to me to require. In doing this, however, it takes up only what is most important and essential. It is my hope that this book will not be an entirely unwelcome addition even for those readers who are familiar with my earlier works as well as with the discussion of the “Logik der Psychologie” in my “Logik der Geisteswissenschaften” (Wundt, 1896/1897, pp. V-VI).

On this occasion I am interested in commemorating the 150th anniversary of the first edition of the Grundzüge. However, as Blumenthal and Araujo have pointed out, the first edition is evidence of a work in transition and it is only in the second edition of 1880 that certain concepts begin to mature. Moreover, it has also been argued that it is only after formalizing his entire philosophical system that Wundt fully matures his conception of psychology (Araujo, 2016). This can be seen in the Grudriss der Psychologie, the first edition of which dates from 1896, that is, after the Logik (Wundt, 1883), the Ethik (Wundt 1886) and the System der Philosophie (Wundt, 1889).

WUNDTIAN PSYCHOLOGY AS THE STUDY OF THE SUBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE

A first mythical issue that I am interested in questioning concerns the consideration of Wundt as the father of a new science, the Experimental Psychology (Boring, 1950; Cattell, 1888; Titchener, 1921). Of course, it is clear that in 1879 Wundt established a Laboratory of Experimental Psychology. However, it is not always considered that this laboratory was attached to one of the chairs of Philosophy at the University of Leipzig. For this reason, far from the image of the birth of an independent discipline, this experimental psychology was a preparatory discipline for philosophy, and it was focused on the problem of knowledge.

Indeed, the initial problem that worried such experimental psychology, and which guided its main research, was the problem of the errors of perception observed in astronomical observatories:

Astronomers had noticed certain sources of error in the temporal determination of movements of the heavenly bodies which, while they tended to invalidate the objective value of an observation, cast at the same time a most instructive light upon the subjective peculiarities of the observer (Wundt, 1896b, p. 267).

Bessel compared his own results with those of other astronomers, and came to the surprising conclusion that it is hardly possible to find two observers who put the passage of a star at precisely the same time, and that the personal differences may amount to a whole second. These observations were confirmed at all observatories, and in the course of the experiments many other interesting facts came to light. It was found, for instance, that the personal difference between two observers is a variable quantity, fluctuating, as a rule, but little in short periods of time, but showing larger variations in the course of months and years (Wundt, 1896b, p. 268).

These errors of perception were due to personal differences. Wundt emphasized that it was not possible to eliminate these errors in astronomical observations. But it was possible “by artificial means under circumstances ... a comparison of actual and estimated times” (Wundt, 1896b, p. 270). Interestingly, the errors of perception and the personal differences discovered in astronomy, beyond the particularity of the measurement of the stars in astronomy, were of relevance for the type of university characteristic of Germany, centered on the processes of knowledge production (Dobson & Bruce, 1972). It has been pointed out that the higher education system in the states that were part of Germany was oriented towards research.

Thus, when the University of Berlin was established in 1810, “this new university was intended primarily to further knowledge and only secondarily to train students for professional, political, or civil service careers” (Dobson & Bruce, 1972, p. 204; emphasis added). In an analogous direction, at the end of the 19th century Paulsen stressed: “according to the German conception the university professor is at once teacher and scientific investigator, and the latter feature is the more prominent” (Paulsen, 1895, p. 6). On the other hand, university professors and researchers, like all university graduates in general, were highly prestigious in society, true mandarins (Ringer, 1969).

That is, errors of perception implied admitting that different subjects of knowledge - not only astronomers - responded uniquely and differently to identical stimuli. This was a matter of concern in view of the aims of the German university. For this reason, an attempt was made to scientifically understand this personal difference in order to give scientific knowledge back its full validity. Various sciences, from physiological optics to physiology and from physiological psychology to psychology, tried to answer this question. Indeed, two of the most important fields of research in the famous Experimental Psychology Laboratory at Leipzig, especially in the early years, were those of reaction time and psychophysiology of the senses, especially visual and auditory sensation (Saiz, Saiz & Mulberger, 1990). Wundt himself emphasized in a report on the laboratory:

There are major works on the intensity of sensations (the questions of “psychophysics” in the narrower sense) 14, on tactile sensations 7, sound psychology 12, light sensations 16, sense of taste 4, sense of smell 1, spatial visual perceptions 6, the course of ideas and concepts of time (sense of time) 15, experimental aesthetics 3, attentional processes 10, feelings and affects 7,
associative and memory processes 8 (Wundt, 1909, p. 133, translation is mine). Es beziehen sich auf die Intensität der Empfindungen (die Fragen der "Psychophysik" im engeren Sinne) 14, auf die Tastempfindungen 7, Tonspsychologie 12, Lichtenempfindungen 16, Geschmackssinn 4, Geruchssinn 1, räumliche Gesichtswahrnehmungen 6, Verlauf der Vorstellungen und Zeitvorstellungen (Zeitsinn) 15, experimentelle Asthetik 3, Aufmerksamkeitsvorgänge 10, Gefühle und Affekte 7, Assoziations- und Erinnerungsvorgänge 8 größere Arbeiten (Wundt, 1909, p. 133) The problem studied in the reaction time experiments was precisely the one mentioned above. It was a question of determining the temporal magnitude of the response to a stimulus perceived by the external senses. And the studies devoted to the psychophysiology of the senses were part of a similar problem, as they tried to determine the transformation and the representative course of the data originating from certain external stimuli. It is necessary to make it clear, then, that this experimental psychology was no longer concerned with the study of any hypothetical internal sense, as criticized by Kant, but that the basis of mental processes originated in the external senses (Klappenbach, 1994).

One hundred years after Newton wrote The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, Kant, an admirer of Newton, published his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. In this work, Kant asserted that “in any special doctrine of nature there can be only as much proper science as there is mathematics therein” (Kant, 1786/2004, p. 6), thus philosophically consolidating Newtonian science. In this sense, the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science constituted the Kantian programme for the development of scientific knowledge, universalising and generalising an already existing and well-known scientific model: that of mechanical physics. In this text Kant distinguished two kinds of science: that of the external senses and that of the internal senses. However, this distinction was only formal, for in fact, the only one capable of becoming a proper science was the science of the outer senses (“doctrine of body”). Such a distinction was derived from Cartesian dualism, which, as is well known, recognized only the phenomenon of extension in bodies. If the soul, by definition, lacked extension, no mathematical analysis would be possible, since measurement, order, proportion, quantification, in short, mathematics, was only applicable to extensive phenomena, that is, to those phenomena that originated in objects occupying a place in space, and for that reason, benefited from the three dimensions of every extensive body. In such perspective, when Kant asserted that psychology could not become a science proper, he was confirming that the soul, the inner sense, had only one dimension and therefore mathematical processes were not applicable to it. Kant, in fact, does nothing more than consolidate epistemologically what he had already anticipated in Cartesian dualism: if the science we know (Newtonian science) deals mathematically with large bodies, and psychology deals with the soul, which is definitely inextensive, psychology is not a science. Thus, the opposition between internal sense and external senses is the translation in terms of transcendental aesthetics (that is, pure theory of sensibility) of metaphysical dualism. If through the external senses, we have access to the knowledge of the extensive bodies located in space, the internal sense grants the immediate intuition of the thinking substance, which can only be located in time, as developed in the Second Section of the Transcendental aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason (Kant, 1781/1998). Wundt, on the other hand, made it clear that the object of study of psychology was not the inner sense but the experience of knowledge itself, which begins with the external senses. But while natural science ignores the subject and only studies mediated experience, psychology focuses precisely on the subject of knowledge, that is, immediate experience:

[psychology as the science of immediate experience] recognizes no real difference between inner and outer experience, but finds the distinction only in the different points of view from which unitary experience is considered in the two cases (Wundt, 1896/1897, p. 8).

[…] The experience dealt with in the natural sciences and in psychology are nothing but components of one experience regarded from different points of view: in the natural sciences as an interconnection of objective phenomena and, in consequence of the abstraction from the knowing subject, as mediate experience; in psychology as immediate and undervived experience (Wundt, 1896/1897, p. 314).

In other words, Wundt started from Kant's phenomenological monism (it is possible to know only the phenomena of knowledge) but introduced a dualism in the nature of the experience of knowledge (not in the nature of the senses). From his perspective, the experience of knowledge was split into two points of view: if the study was about phenomena perceived through the external senses, abstracting from the subject of knowledge, it is about the study of mediated experience. In this case, the experience is mediated by the subject, but the study of the subject is ignored, which is proper to the field of the natural sciences. If, on the other hand, the study is concerned precisely within the subject of knowledge, it is the study of immediate experience, and this is proper to psychology. Wundt modified the object of study of psychology from the internal sense to the immediate experience of knowledge obtained by the external senses. I dare say that this modification was much more important than the creation of the laboratory of experimental psychology and with it the introduction of the experimental method in psychology. Again, the intimate relationship of Wundt's psychology to philosophy and to Kant's programme can be seen, even if it was necessary to question some aspects of Kantian postulates. The problems that Wundt faced in
his laboratory were typically philosophical problems. Psychology studied what the subject of knowledge feels, perceives, and the affects that accompany the sensations. Both the natural sciences and psychology depend on the observation of phenomena through the external senses, and it is this experience that Wundt divides into an immediate aspect that studies what is perceived and affects the knowing subject; and on the other hand, the mediate experience that bypasses the subject. That is why Wundt affirmed that psychology can be considered the most empirical science of all (Wundt, 1896).

Psychology is even more empirical than physics, since physics elaborates all its theory by abstracting from the knowing subject.

It can be seen, then, that the laboratory of experimental psychology founded by Wundt investigated the immediate experience of knowledge. That is, what the subject experienced in his own experience of knowledge from the stimuli originating in the external senses and the relations they produced in mental representations. It is not by chance that a classic text of the French historical-epistemological tradition, Georges Canguilhem (1958) referred to a psychology as a science of the subjectivity of the external sense. But at the same time as Wundt was conducting research in the laboratory to study the simplest phenomena of mental life, namely the simple sensations produced by the external senses, Wundt argued that the experimental method could only be used in the study of the simplest phenomena of mental life; more complex phenomena, on the other hand, required the method of observation of cultural products:

Psychology has, like natural science, two exact methods: the experimental method, serving for the analysis of simpler psychical processes, and the observation of general mental products, serving for the investigation of the higher psychical processes and developments (Wundt, 1896/1897, pp. 23-24; emphasis is mine).

And just as Wundt conducted research in experimental psychology for the simple phenomena mentioned above, he also undertook the study of more complex processes in his Völkerpsychologie. Since the work of Michael Cole, among others, the translation of Völkerpsychologie as cultural psychology has become common. Precisely in his book Cultural Psychology, Cole pointed out: “In recent years interest has grown in Wundt's 'second psychology,' the one to which he assigned the task of understanding how culture enters into psychological processes” (Cole, 1996, p. 22).

For this reason, as a synthesis of what has been said so far, the problem that experimental psychology tried to answer was the problem of the subject of knowledge. This also explains why the subjects of the experiment were always, in the first place, human beings, and not rats or chickens or fish as in experimental research in the United States. And secondly, not just any human being either, but precisely scientists who were sufficiently trained and who were themselves subjects accustomed to the practices surrounding knowledge and research, which allowed for an exchange between the experimenter and the subject of the experiment (Danziger, 1985, 1990). And such a strategic objective made psychology not only a complementary science to natural science, but also a preparatory science for philosophy (Wundt, 1896). This also explains why the first journal founded by Wundt in 1881 was entitled Philosophische Studien (Philosophical Studies) and why its aim was “to communicate a number of works on philosophical problems whose development seems to me to be fruitful and from a point of view that I consider scientific” (Wundt, 1882, quoted by Saiz, Saiz & Mulberger, 1990, p. 412). He also explains that during Wundt's lifetime, a psychological society was never organized in Leipzig (Danziger, 1979b).

In that direction, Barcelona-based psychology historians Milagros Saiz, Dolores Saiz and Annette Mülberger quantitatively analyzed the journal output of German psychology. They compared Wundtian psychology in Germany with other developments in German psychology that they subsume under the category of non-Wundtian psychologies (encompassing the production of scholars such as Meumann, Müller, Stumpf, Lipps, Heymans, Messer, among others). Methodological issues account for about 20% of the papers. On the other hand, when comparing certain classical topics developed by experimental psychology such as psychology of the senses, visual perception and others, a strong weight of these topics is observed in Wundtian psychology, around 32%; in the case of non-Wundtian psychology this percentage ranged between 25 and 56.8% depending on the journal (Saiz, Saiz & Mulberger, 1999). These data confirm that the problem of perception (visual, auditory, etc.) was a problem of German psychology as a whole, which is to be expected considering once again the scientific matrix of the German university.

**ANOTHER MYTHICAL ISSUES AROUND WUNDT**

We seem to have argued that characterizing Wundt as the father of experimental psychology implies ignoring the context of the German university that made research such as Wundt's possible and the roots of philosophical problems in his work. It also neglects the criticisms and limits that Wundt himself recognized in experimental psychology. Similarly, there are other claims about Wundt that also need to be quickly reviewed. One of them claims that Wundt was an atomist or an elementalist, since just as physics started from atoms, Wundt relied on what he called the “minimal elements of mental processes”, which were sensations and feelings. However, Wundt clearly pointed out that in psychology the researcher encounters complex phenomena and, in any case, is obliged to abstract and analyze them:
All the contents of psychical experience are of a composite character. It follows, therefore, that psychical elements, or the absolutely simple and irreducible components of psychical phenomena, can not be found by analysis alone, but only with the aid of abstraction. This abstraction is rendered possible by the fact that the elements are in reality united in different ways (Wundt, 1897, p. 29; emphasis added).

The actual contents of psychical experience always consist of various combinations of sensational and affective elements, so that the specific character of the simple psychical processes depends for the most part not on the nature of these elements so much as on their union into composite psychical compounds (Wundt 1897, p. 23).

The attributes of psychical compounds are never limited to those of the elements that enter into them, but new attributes, peculiar to the compounds themselves, always arise as a result of the combination of these elements (Wundt 1897, p. 91).

Contrary to the sometimes widespread image, Wundt conceived of mental processes in their true complexity. And although Wundt began his study of the Grundriss and other works by first studying the mental elements (die psychischen Elemente), he did so out of analytical necessity. It was clear to Wundt that in the immediate experience of knowledge what appears are compounds (die psychischen Gebilde) and above all the connections of these psychic formations (die Zusammenhang der psychischen Gebilde).

And the last question concerns Wundt as a psychologist of consciousness, a question which is very widespread in my own country. Actually, Wundt was not unaware of the existence of unconscious processes, although he did not, of course, relate unconscious processes to repressed infantile sexuality. However, he also recognized that unconscious processes were the result of mental dynamics and that they generated dispositions for future mental processes:

So we come to distinguish grades of consciousness. The lower limit, or zero grade, is unconsciousness. This condition, which consists in an absolute absence of all psychical interconnections, is essentially different from the disappearance of single psychical contents from consciousness. The latter is continually taking place in the flow of mental processes. Complex ideas and feelings and even single elements of these compounds may disappear, and new ones take their places...... Any psychical element that has disappeared from consciousness, is to be called unconscious in the sense that we assume the possibility of its renewal, that is, its reappearance in the actual interconnection of psychical processes (Wundt, 1897, pp. 207-208).

What I have called historiographical traditions, both Anglo-Saxon and psychoanalytic, constructed an account of Wundt’s work that often turned out to be more myth than truth (Klappenbach, 2006; Schultz & Schultz, 1996). Fortunately, in recent decades the enormous complexity of Wundt’s work and its philosophical substratum have been highlighted (Araujo, 2016).

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Iberoamerican psychology: past, present and perspectives
A congress on the history of psychology in Lima (Perú),
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The history of psychology as a specialty is experiencing a golden age. Despite the cuts in the academic training programs for psychologists that respond to the purpose of reducing the presence of the humanities as much as possible, the history of psychology courses continue to maintain their presence (although perhaps with fewer hours) in the curricula. study.

In Latin America there has always been a great and consistent interest in historical subjects. The obsessive question of Latin Americans about their identity has led them to study the past of their countries and their cultures, the history of psychological knowledge from its most remote times to the present. The activity on this subject is very intense and the work of Ana María Jacó-Vilela, spiritus movens of a working group established in Brazil but with resonances throughout the continent, should be highlighted along these lines. Recently, she has co-edited The Palgrave biographical encyclopedia of psychology in Latin America (Jacó-Vilela et al., 1923), a reference work in which specialists from all over Latin America and also from some European countries have participated.

On the other hand, there are numerous works by Latin Americans in the pages of the important Revista de Historia de la Psicología (Journal of the History of Psychology), founded in 1980 by Helio Carpintero, the most distinguished Spanish historian of psychology today. The Revista Peruana de Historia de la Psicología, animated by Walter Arias (Arequipa) and Tomás Caycho (Lima), is published in Arequipa (south of Peru).

But while there are numerous works devoted to studying the history of psychology in Europe and the United States, the same is not true of the rest of the world. For example, we lack a history of psychology in Africa or Asia. Given the extension of both continents as well as the great variety of cultures within them, it is understandable that no attempt has been made to write a history of psychology that encompasses these cultures, and that what exists are rather partial or local histories. Let us point out, however, that there are already some attempts that seek to correct these deficiencies, as is the case of the recent book by Hannes Stubbe with the title of Weltgeschichte der Psychologie (Stubbe, 2021), who in the 1980s published an excellent work dedicated to the history of psychology in Brazil (Stubbe, 1987).

Despite the efforts of specialists in this part of the world, Latin America has not been treated in all the detail it deserves, except for the important book published a few years ago by Ruben Ardila (1986). It is true, however, that since then important monographs have been published dedicated to some countries such as Peru (e.g. León, 1993, Alarcón, 2001), Chile (Salas & Lizama, 2009), Uruguay (Pérez Gambini, 1999), Argentina (the numerous works of Hugo Klappenbach) and Brazil, just to mention a few of the many countries that the region is home to.

A recent congress on the history of psychology held between March 24 and 26, 2022 and organized by professors and students from the Universidad Nacional Federico Villarreal brought together a fairly large group of scholars on the history of psychology. Throughout the several days of the event, they discussed the development of psychology in their respective countries, the importance of European emigration and Peruvian psychology personalities. Duly edited, all the papers are in the process of being published by the publishing house of the Ricardo Palma University, also of Lima (Vivanco et al., in press).
The papers presented at this congress offer an overview of the current state of psychology as a science and as a profession in Latin America. It is a panorama in which contrasts predominate, since in some countries, such as Mexico and Brazil, psychology has reached a level of diffusion and considerable scientific development, while in others (such as Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador), this development is much smaller.

There is no doubt that this different level of development is due to a series of factors that have had and continue to have great significance. The geopolitical and economic importance of Mexico and Brazil were a magnet to attract visitors or immigrants to European scientists in the interwar years and in those of the Spanish civil war. But also before: Paul Janet traveled from his beloved France to Mexico in the 1910s to give a series of conferences, and there were many French scientific delegations that visited Brazil, in the case of psychology and psychiatry headed by Georges Dumas. (Bandeira de Melo & Freitas Campos, 2014).

The European atmosphere of a city like Buenos Aires attracted many intellectuals (Luis Jiménez de Asúa in law; and in psychoanalysis the young Ángel Garma, whose work would be decisive for the spread of Freudian ideas in Latin America, without forgetting the Hungarian Béla Székely; Ben Plotkin & Ruperthuz Honorato, 2017). Countries like the Andeans were less attractive due to their lower level of development, the even greater distances coupled with the presence of that monumental barrier that is the Andes, and the prevailing chronic political instability. Even so, some psychologists settled in them (Walter Blumenfeld in Peru) or spent long periods of time (León, 2014).

The presentations also reveal the undeniable Americanization of Latin American psychology. If in the 70s and even the 80s there was a lot of bibliography coming from European authors (French, German, Spanish to a greater extent, but also British and even Italian). Today what is found in Latin American bookstores and libraries is above all literature from from United States. Perhaps the only exception is the “popularity” enjoyed by Lev S. Vygotsky in Latin America. With the vast majority of his works translated into Spanish, the ideas of this Russian thinker have great appeal in Latin America and stimulate numerous studies in the field of educational and developmental psychology.

But, likewise, one cannot fail to point out the immense importance and diffusion that psychoanalysis has in Argentina, perhaps the country with the highest ratio of psychoanalysts/inhabitants in the region and in the world. In the country of the Río de la Plata, Freud continues to be read and discussed, and his ideas have become an integral element of the national culture.

If psychoanalysis maintains its strength in Argentina, in the case of Cuba a process of de-Sovietization of psychology has occurred. It is not easy to access Cuban materials, but from what can be known, the influence of the psychology that was practiced in the late Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a thing of the past, but the interest in Marxist ideology and its possibilities for psychology continues in force.

But the Latin American social reality also poses monumental challenges. Despite the efforts of some governments and the bonanza in fiscal funds until a few years ago, many countries are experiencing very delicate economic situations (the case of Argentina), which have consequences on people’s lives and mental health. Social explosions have been frequent in Ecuador, Colombia, Peru and Chile. The case of Haiti is the most dramatic of all and qualifying it would require enriching the language with new terms: “Haiti is falling apart” headlined the Spanish newspaper El País in a report that appeared in the February 13th edition of this year.

How to understand and reduce the levels of violence in the Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador) but also in Mexico and Colombia? What contributions can come from psychologists in the fight against poverty that drives many Central Americans to emigrate to the United States? These are just two of the many problematic issues in the region, to which many more can be added: rampant populism, political and everyday violence, corruption, drug trafficking and drug use.

To these relatively new topics (very little was discussed and researched in Latin America about drug use or political violence some 30 or 40 years ago) is added the one that has always been present in the concern of psychologists and scholars of Latin American: the national identity.

National identity, its study and its knowledge must provide an answer to the question that obsesses Latin American inhabitants, from the most educated and cosmopolitan to the least educated: who are we? what is our place in the world? Many are the ink and the pages used to answer this question in which psychology, anthropology, history and even philosophy intertwine, as shown by some of the great works that have been written on the subject (e.g., Ramos, 1934, Peace, 1950, Gissi, 2002, Larraín, 2001, Alarcón, 2017).

The review of the papers shows the strength and vitality of psychology in Latin America. Psychology has become a mass profession: many study it, as are many who also turn to psychologists for advice in the field of mental health, education, sports, organizational reality, etc.
This vitality also explains the growing presence of Latin American psychologists in world forums, facilitated by the wonders of technology that allow faster communications, more frequent international collaborations, and presentations that in the past were very difficult to carry out.

This is precisely what is clear from the review of the papers presented at the Federico Villarreal National University congress, the first to be held in Latin America exclusively devoted to this subject. The congress was virtual because even the limitations imposed by the Covid-19 pandemic were of great weight, but despite that it had more than 40 speakers and attracted the attention of a huge number of virtual attendees, who not only listened to the presentations but made numerous questions and comments.

References
Larraín, J. (2001). Identidad chilena. LOM.
It is with deep sadness that the Department of Philosophy announces the passing of one of its most eminent members, Professor Emeritus Ian M. Hacking, CC, FRSC, FBA. The influential scholar, teacher, and prolific author—whose wide-ranging work probed foundational questions about the nature of concepts and who is credited with bringing a historical approach to the philosophy of science—passed away on May 10, 2023, after years of declining health.

Born in Vancouver in 1936, Hacking studied mathematics and physics at the University of British Columbia (BA, 1956) before moving on to the University of Cambridge, where he earned a bachelor’s degree (1958) and a PhD (1962) in Moral Sciences.

Having taught at the University of British Columbia (1964-69; seconded to Makerere University College, Uganda in 1968-69), Cambridge University (1969-74), and Stanford University (1975-82), Hacking joined the University of Toronto, where he taught in the Department of Philosophy and the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology from 1982 to 2004. In 1991, the University accorded him its highest honour by appointing him University Professor. In 2000, Hacking became the first Anglophone elected to a permanent position at the Collège de France, where he held the Chair in the Philosophy and History of Scientific Concepts until his retirement in 2006. In addition, he held visiting positions at universities around the world.
La investigación psicológica en América Latina: Historia, ciencia y formación

Walter Arias & Miguel Gallegos
(Editores)
First Edition: April 2023

The book has been divided into two parts. The first part showcases the scientific development in some branches of psychology in countries such as Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Paraguay. Thus, the first chapter, "Notes on Social Psychology in Brazil," written by Mariana Prioli Cordeiro and Mary Jane Spink, analyzes theoretical and formative aspects of this branch in the largest country in South America.

In the second chapter, "Striving for Psychology in Schools: Building a Liberating Horizon for Education," written by Raquel Guzzo, some initiatives that have favored the development of educational psychology in Brazil are briefly discussed. In the third chapter, Sonia Guedes, Jairo Borges-Andrade, and Antônio Bittencourt focus on the "Scientific Development and Challenges of Work and Organizational Psychology in Brazil," while the fourth chapter, titled "Neuropsychology in Brazil: Past, Present, and Future," reviews the advances that have unfolded in the field of neuroscience, authored by Izabel Hazin and Isabel Oliveira. In the fifth chapter, "Research in the History of Psychology in Brazil," Ana María Jacó-Vilela explains the historiographic production, also in Brazil. Subsequently, Rubén Ardila, in the sixth section, discusses the directions taken by "Psychological Research in Colombia," analyzing the topics, journals, and scientific events that position Colombia as one of the countries with the highest research activity in South America. In the seventh chapter titled "An Approach to Understanding the Reality of Psychological Research in Peru," Edwin Salas and Walter Arias extensively analyze the issues surrounding psychological research in Peru, highlighting the limitations that need to be overcome to improve academic standards in the country. In the eighth chapter, José Emilio García reviews "Psychological Research in Paraguay: History, Traditions, and Current Scenarios," emphasizing the research areas of various branches of Paraguayan psychology.

The second part of the book focuses on psychological production in a more general sense, exploring various countries and theoretical-scientific trends that have developed in Latin America. Thus, the first work authored by Ramón León, Walter Arias, Mauricio Borja, and Tomás Caycho is titled "Psychological Research in Latin America: Its Historical Roots
and Current Developments," which provides a historical overview of Latin American psychology, highlighting its main characteristics and trends in terms of academic production. In the tenth chapter, Miguel Gallegos presents a brief historical journey on "Latin American Psychology Journals" of a general nature. In the eleventh chapter, Fernando Polanco, Josiane Sueli Beria, Hugo Klappenbach, and Rubén Ardila conduct an analysis of two of the most important and representative journals in Latin America, titled "Behaviorism in the Americas through a Sociobibliometric Study of Two Regional Scientific Journals (1967-2008)."

In the twelfth chapter, Mariano Ruperthuz, Fernando Ferrari, and Catriel Fierro present the developments of psychoanalysis in Chile and Argentina under the title "Research in Psychology in Latin America at the Intersection with Psychoanalysis: The Case of Chile and Argentina (1896-1974)." In the thirteenth chapter, titled "Psychology in Brazil: Research and Graduate Studies," the formative aspects of postgraduate programs in Psychology in Brazil are analyzed, authored by Antonio Bittencourt, Emmanuel Zagury, Oswaldo Hajime, and Paulo Meira. Finally, in the fourteenth chapter, María Andrea Piñeda and Patricia Scherman review the "Scientific Policies and Professionalization of Argentine Psychology" within the framework of studies on senses and perception. All the works have been critically developed by renowned authors in Latin America who have made efforts to provide us with an understanding of the reality of psychological research, primarily in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Paraguay. While there is a significant number of works on Brazil, this only reflects the systematic production of Brazilian psychology in various specialties, as Brazil is responsible for half of the scientific production in psychology throughout Latin America.

We would like to express our gratitude to all the authors of each chapter who have contributed to this project, which has come to fruition after several years of work. We are fortunate to see this project materialize, thanks to the Editorial Fund of the Ricardo Palma University. In that regard, we also want to extend our appreciation to Ramón León, the main promoter of the project, as well as the university authorities of this institution. It is our hope that this book will be consulted by psychology professionals and students, allowing them to gain knowledge and understanding of the historical, scientific, and formative guidelines presented in the text, and to become aware of the academic advancements that have taken place in Latin American psychology.
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